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By establishing a static one period game of an uninformed policy maker, who is benevolent and 
values common folks' freedom of speech, and a potentially informed messenger, this essay 
investigates the strategies of ideologues in equilibrium, compares the social welfare under different 
cost schemes and discusses the best cost scheme and cost level for the policy maker to set to attain 
highest social welfare. 
When people are allowed to speak freely, social welfare may be reduced for that the policy 
maker wil l make biased policy because of contaminated information. When speech is strictly 
restricted, social welfare may be reduced because the policy maker is unable to elicit any information 
from the informed messenger. There exists a trade-off between information contamination and 
information loss for policy maker in cost setting. The findings of this essay indicate as follows. First, 
when the issue is rather controversial, no cost should be imposed i f the policy maker is keen on 
protecting the majority's freedom of speech. Second, when the state of nature is unverifiable, 
limiting the act of delivering speech and limiting the content of the message make no difference to 
the social welfare. Third, in general, ex post scheme, under which silence may convey useful 
information, is better in maximizing social welfare than the ex ante schemes. Four, the cost imposed 
can not monotonically increase as the disparity of common folks and ideologues increases, in order 
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The freedom to express one's opinion without censorship or limitation is enshrined as an 
inalienable right in many parts of the world. The British philosopher John Stuart Mill, forerunner of 
the defense for liberty of expression, published the classic work of freedom of speech, On Liberty, in 
1859 and an abundance of researches on the advocacy of free speech emerged since then. Meanwhile, 
no absolute freedom of speech does exist in any part of the world. As stated in the Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2008), “no society has yet existed where speech has not been limited to 
some extent". The advocate of freedom of speech, John Stuart Mill, admitted as well the necessity to 
limit free speech and put forward the so called Harm Principle^ to regulate some actions of members 
in political society. In one recent example U.K. government after the London riots in August 
considers restricting social media to prevent internet users from initiating more anti-govemment 
activities. In another example last year Philippine media was criticized for the live coverage during 
the Hong Kong hostage-taking that contributed to the loss of the hostage tragedy. 
In reality, nobody can arbitrarily speak to the authority without any cost and such opportunity 
cost as time or money inevitably incurs whenever people want to express their views, of which the 
reason may be as follows. The freedom of speech is a double-edged sword which cuts both ways. For 
one thing, citizens who potentially have private information may express their views on public 
affairs to the authority to adjust policies and the government can make progress gradually by 
gathering opinions from the public. Yet i f no speech from the public is allowed to be delivered, the 
authority wil l become the sole decision maker without any information available from the public. 
However, i f speech is completely free to be delivered, there wil l be too many views to be heard and 
the authority wil l fail to effectively listen to their voices. For another, citizens may deliberately 
deliver biased message to influence the policy for the sake of seeking private interest, and biased 
message are more likely to be delivered i f it is costless to do so. Thus, the pros and cons of the 
freedom of speech always coexist. The existence of freedom of speech may help pass useful 
information from the informed public to the uninformed policy maker, while costless speech may 
lead to too many opinions to be expressed and may as well increase the noise of the speech. 
Existing researches, such as Kretzmer and Kazan (2000), Djankov, el (2003), etc. mainly 
focus on defense for freedom of expression, limitation of free speech in moral sense, conflict 
‘ H a r m Principle states that “the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, 
against his will, is to prevent harm to others.", which can be found in On Liberty, Oxford University, pp. 21-22. ， 
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between democracy and law, how to set up punishment to threaten people overusing the freedom and 
related controversial social issues like pornography and hate speech. However, little previous 
research on free speech is found in economics. The most related topic in economics focuses on 
media capture on analyzing freedom of speech, such as Mullainathan and Shleifer (2005), Besley 
and Prat (2006) Besley and Burgess (2002). Researches in media capture mostly emphasize private 
interest of the government, assuming that the limitation to free speech compromises discipline to 
government and allows government to pursue private interest. Different from the researches in media 
capture, this paper emphasizes the private interests of citizens and assumes citizens may advocate 
biased information to lead (even benevolent) government policies to their favor. Even the 
government without private interest is benevolent, citizens may deliberately deliver biased message 
for their own interests which are different from the public. 
Based on the research of Morris (2001) and Prendergast (1993)，in Section I I of this essay, I 
establish a static one period game with asymmetric information between an uninformed policy maker 
and one potentially informed messenger with two types. In this model, the policy maker needs to 
make up a policy dependent on the nature of state. There are two types of inhabitants, of which the 
majority is common folk with moderate preference and only a few inhabitants are radical ideologues 
with extreme preference. A l l inhabitants may independently receive an imperfect but informative 
signal related to the state nature and one of them, randomly selected by the nature, is to send 
message to the policy maker according to the signal observed or unobserved. Because the policy 
maker does not know the type of the messenger, to maximize social welfare which is the same as 
common folks, the policy maker maintains a scheme A: such that, when message is delivered in the 
state，a cost incurs to the messenger. Since the policy maker respects inhabitants' right to speak, the 
cost imposed wil l not be as high as to prevent common folks from honestly delivering message. 
According to the verification of the nature state and the content of message, three kinds of cost 
schemes are considered in this essay. The cost for speech scheme, in which the cost incurs as long as 
any message is delivered, applies i f neither the state of nature nor the content of message is verifiable; 
the cost for message scheme, in which cost incurs only when biased message is delivered, applies i f 
the content of message is verifiable; and the cost for bias scheme, in which cost is dependent on 
signal and incurs when message is different from the state of the nature, applies when both the state 
of nature and the content of message are verifiable. Facing the cost scheme chosen by the policy 
maker，the messenger delivers the message that can generate highest net payoff. After that, the policy 
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maker updates his belief of the state of nature and makes policy with posterior belief. 
Detailed analysis and social welfare comparison are included in Section III. Constrained on the 
cost scheme which enables common folks to honestly report the signal observed, I analyze the best 
response of ideologues under three cost schemes and different levels of cost. I find that both the cost 
for speech scheme and the cost for message scheme have the same effect on ideologues' equilibrium 
behavior. This finding implies that, i f the true state is unverifiable in reality, it makes no difference to 
the ideologues that the government imposes cost for all speech or only for a certain message. In 
particular, under both schemes, the ideologues either always deliver biased message (being "radical") 
or always maintain silence (being "conservative"). The social welfare is lower when ideologues are 
radical than that when ideologues are conservative since no message is contaminated i f ideologues 
remain silent. Under the cost for bias scheme, the ideologues have incentive to differentiate message 
in response to signals and there are four equilibria, of which ideologues may be less radical or less 
conservative than that under the other two schemes. Comparing all possible equilibria, social welfare 
is highest i f ideologues honestly deliver message when the signal they favor is observed otherwise 
keep silent; and social welfare is lowest when ideologues always deliver biased message regardless 
of the signal received. This suggests that, to avoid ideologues being radical or conservative, when 
possible the cost imposed should differentiate regarding to the state of nature and message delivered. 
Based on the social welfare comparison, I find that when the divergence of common folks and 
ideologues is comparatively small, with the help of the cost for bias scheme, policy maker may attain 
highest social welfare by imposing cost which increases as the disparity increases; however, when 
the disparity is so large that it is impossible for policy maker to induce ideologues not to deliver 
biased message, policy maker should eliminate the cost in order not to discourage the common folk 
honestly reporting signal received. Besides, I also find i f the accuracy of the signal is low, for the 
same cost and same difference between ideologues and common folks, the ideologues' behavior in 
equilibrium is determined by the expectation of the policy maker on ideologues. 
Finally, section IV concludes the paper. 
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11. MODEL 
Imagine an economy with a unit mass of inhabitants headed by a leader ("D") who has to make 
policy decision ae^l according to the state of nature. The state of nature is a random variable co, 
being either 0 or 1 with equal probability. There are two types of inhabitants, common folks of 
measure-one and ideologues of measure-zero. With the benefit from the policy be i ng - [ a - c ^ +c, 
where c is a large positive constant, common folks hope to make a policy as close to the state of 
nature as possible. Ideologues, on the other hand, derive a benefit equals to yftz，> 0，and hence 
wants the policy to be as large as possible. 
The true state of nature is not revealed to anyone in the country until the policy is implemented. 
However, prior to the implementation, each inhabitant may independently receive a noisy signal 
s e {0，l} with probability 1 - g and may fail to observe any signal with probability q . Among them one 
inhabitant, whom I refer to as a messenger ("M"), is selected by the nature to speak out to D. The 
probability that M is selected from the set of common folks and the probability that M is 
selected from the set of ideologues i s l - A . M ' s type is the private information of M. 
Note that the chance that an ideologue is picked up to speak out is not negligible despite the 
measure of ideologue is zero. This may be justified in the current context as the delivery of message 
influences the public policy, thus has a nature of public good, the provision of which may very well 
suffer from the classical free-rider problem. I f for some reasons this does arise, then it's reasonable to 
assume the problem be more severe in a large group than a small one. Indeed, in reality, it is not 
uncommon to see ideologues being more vocal and radical ideas being expressed. 
To formulate the situation when M does not receive any signal, I note that not receiving any 
message is equivalent to receiving an uninformative signal. A signal is uninformative i f it is received 
with equal probability in every state of nature. Without loss of generality, let the uninformative signal 
be •y = 0.5， 
p[s = 0.和0 )=p[s = 0.和 1) 
and the chance of M receivings = 0.5 is therefore分.Signals5 = 0 and^ y = 1 are informative but not 
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perfect and the probability of signal being consistent with the state of nature is^^e 
In this model, D possesses two characteristics. First, D is benevolent, who hopes to maximize 
the social welfare of the state. Given the fact that common folks are of measure-one, the payoff of D 
equals to the benefit of the policy for the common folks, and hence is in conflict with that of radical 
ideologues: 
UD - -{a -cof ^-c 
In this regard, M drawn from ideologues may be viewed as a biased messenger ("B") while M 
coming from common folks a good messenger (“G’，). 
As B favors extreme policy hence is inclined to deliver biased message, D maintains a scheme 
k such that, when message m is delivered in the state co, a cost p^ (m, co) incurs to the messenger M. 
Herein lies the second characteristic of D: D respects inhabitants' right to speak in the sense that he 
hopes to guarantee common folks will be willing to reveal their signals despite of the presence of 
scheme k . Therefore, D wishes to choose a scheme to minimize the adverse effect caused by B 
without distorting G's incentive to report his signal honestly. 
I examine three kinds of schemes. The first scheme {k = \) imposes cost as long as a message is 
delivered and is therefore referred to as cost for speech. An example for such a scheme is laws that 
require people to apply for approval i f they want to hold a procession to express their opinions in 
public, which can be costly both in time and money; while violating these laws can by itself result in 
prison time. The cost for speech is expressed as: 
[O z/m = 0.5,Vfi； 
The second cost scheme {k = 2) imposes cost whenever some particular message (in the current 
context,m = \ ) is delivered and is therefore referred to as cost for message. Considering thatw = lis 
likely to be used by B to induce extreme policy, D may choose to make it more costly to deliver 
message m = 1 ’ so as to let B refrain from using w = 1. For example, a government authority may 
block the internet accounts of people who spread politically sensitive messages on the internet. I 
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express such a scheme as: 
pAm.coy[‘ “ 卞 ① 、 
1 0 z/me {0,0.5}, V y^ 
Different from the ex ante schemes mentioned before, the third cost scheme (A: 二 3) is an ex post 
scheme in which cost is imposed when the message is different from the state of nature and is 
therefore referred to as cost for bias. For example, people who make hoax calls resulting in a waste 
of public service or resources may be condemned by the public or even prosecuted by the court. The 
third scheme can also be viewed as the combination of the cost for speech scheme and a reward 
which wi l l be given i f the message is coherent with the state of nature. This is quite common in life, 
such as people who provide the authority with constructive criticism or suggestion may receive 
commendations and rewards. The cost for message can be expressed as: 
p if m ^  coy CO 
p^{m,co)=\ 0 if m = coy CO 
0 ifm = Q.5,Vo) 
With the given cost scheme，the net payoffs of B and G equal to the benefit derived by the policy 
minus the cost of delivering message and are shown below: 
Ug = -{a - cof - pj^{m,co)+c 
UB =/3a-p,{m,a)) 
M either delivers message m = 0 or w = 1，or keeps silent to maximize his net payoff according to 
the signal received. For the ease of formulation, silence may be viewed equivalent to M delivering 
message m ^ {o，l}. Without loss of generality, I let such a message bew = 0.5. 
Denote mf as M's choice of message that maximizes M，s expected net payoff when signal 5 is 
received, 
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m'^ M = B’G (1) 
where is D's choice of policy after receiving m's message w. 
Upon receiving message from M，D updates his belief about the state of nature, according to 
Bayes’ rule, given M's strategy = {m^ ，the probability distribution of M's type, the 
probability distribution of signal given the state of nature. Let p[(Oj\m) be the posterior belief of D 
regarding the state of nature being cOj. 
With this updated belief, D chooses a(w)such that: 
+ ) = argmax£"+C/D («，+). 
Given thatU^(a,oi^m) = -{a-aif the first order condition implies 
a(m) = p{(o,\m). ( 2) 
That is, D's best response to M is to make policy a = 1 with probability \m) while to make policy 
fl = 0 with probability 1 - p[co, \m). After D choosing the policy, the state of nature is realized, the 
scheme is implemented and the payoff realized. [a{m\m^) is an equilibrium for the game governed 
by the scheme/7“m，历)，if (a* (m)，m•似)jointly satisfy equation (1) and (2). The equilibrium concept I 
use is perfect Bayesian equilibrium. And for simplicity, I limit my analysis to pure strategy. 
Each equilibrium is supported with different (m, . By comparing payoffs of different 
equilibria under different schemes, D picks out the cost scheme A： with the lowest possible cost 
Pk (叫历 tha t maximizes the social welfare subject to the constraint that G always honestly report 
signals received. In brief, the objective of D is: 
2 Despite the fact that messenger is single person, it is weakly dominant strategy for the social welfare maximizing D to 
choose the lowest possible cost. 
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max max£'C/^ {p^ (m，a?)). 
A： p 
To sum up, the sequence of the event is as follows. At the beginning, D announces a cost 
scheme、k, p, (m, co)). M receives signal s and delivers message m. Then D chooses policy “(w)with 
updated belief given m. After that, the state of nature o) is realized and payoffs of D and M are 
realized. 
Before I move on to analyze the game, it helps simplify the exposition of this paper i f we 
eliminate certain trivial multiple equilibria. For each equilibrium in which messages w = 0 and w = 1 
are intended for^ = Oand^ = 1, there always exists a trivial corresponding equilibrium, where 
messages w = 0 and w 二 1 are intended for = 1 and = 0 instead. To eliminate this kind of 
"call-white-black" equilibrium, I introduce Assumption 1 for the ensuing analysis. 
Assumption 1 Ms strategy satisfies the following condition: 
PM“koPmKhW{rrhk丨PM(咖)VM € {B,G} 
Assumption 1 means when M observes an informative signal j e {o，l}，the possibility of M 
reporting a corresponding message intended for the signal is at least as large as that of delivering the 
message not intended for the signal received. 
Note that Assumption 1 does not imply that M wi l l be truth telling. For example, as we wil l note 
later, there can be an equilibrium where B always delivers m = 1 regardless of his signal. In this 
particular case, Assumption 1 simply says that B who reports m = 1 is intending to lead D to believe M 
has received signal s = 1 rather than use m = 1 to intend for signal ^  = 0. 
Now I am ready to proceed to the analysis of this model. 
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111. ANALYSIS 
First begin with an implication from Assumption 1: the strategy is weakly increasing in those 
messages that are delivered in equilibrium. When M delivers message m = /’ i e {o,l}，Assumption 1 
implies M is intending to make D believe that he has received signal s = i hence the chance that true 
state of nature being c； = / is higher, so D chooses to make the policy close to the intended signal with 
higher probability. When M keeps silent (w = 0.5 )，he intends to make D believe no signal is 
observed (^ = 0.5 )，in which case D is neutral between making policies a = 0 and a = 1 hence the policy 
is close to the expected state of nature, that is, a。5 is close to 0.5. This observation leads to Lemma 1. 
Lemma 1 D’s policy satisfies the following condition: 
fl,•〜iffi<j 
if both messages m = i and m = j are to be delivered. 
Al l proofs in this analysis are relegated to Appendix. 
Recall that B favors higher policy. By Lemma > a,. Note that i f B has to bear the cost of 
sending message but it is costless to keep silent, then from B，s point of view, the option of keeping 
silent dominates delivering m = 0. This observation brings us to the following lemma. 
Lemma 2 If it is costless for B to keep silent, wf ^0,\fse {0,0.5，l}. 
i. The Cost for Speech Scheme 
When both the state of nature and the content of message are difficult to verify, D has no other 
choice but to implement the cost for speech scheme, which imposes cost as long as a message is 
delivered. 
B，s utility is a function of D，s strategy “(w) and the cost p^m^o)). The expected payoff of B under 
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the cost for speech scheme is shown as follows. 
5 = 0 s = l •s^O.S 
w = 0 
m = l a「p、 a「Pi A—/V 
m = 0.5 «0.5 «0.5 «0.5 
Table 1 Expected payoff of B under the cost for speech scheme 
As shown in Table 1，both and the expected cost are independent of signal, hence the 
expected payoff of B is independent of signal: 
五H凡(“《，历五H/Wk，爪〜 , . 
This in turn implies that the message delivered by B must be independent of signal. 
Lemma 3 Under the cost for speech scheme, the message delivered by B is independent of signal 
Lemma 3 implies, whichever signal is received, ideologues always report the same message and 
has no incentive to make differentiation. By Lemma 2 and Lemma 3，in equilibrium B may either be 
radical to always deliver messagem = lor conservative to always keep silent. The two possible 
equilibria are as follows: 
B G 
5 = 0 s = \ J = 0.5 5 = 0 s = \ 5 = 0.5 
m=0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
w = l 1 1 1 0 1 0 
m = 0.5 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Table 2 Strategy of M with B using radical strategy 
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B G 
5 = 0 s = \ s = 0.5 j = 0 •ysl «y = 0.5 
m=0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
m = l 0 0 0 0 1 0 
m = 0.5 1 1 1 0 0 1 
Table 3 Strategy of M with B using conservative strategy 
Two equilibria can be supported by different and p . Define A', as the set of {pi, which 
sustains the equilibrium with B using strategy/ and G honestly reporting signal observed under the 
cost for speech scheme (A： = l) . Denote i = c when B uses conservative strategy and i = r when B uses 
radical strategy. The maximum of the equilibrium when B uses conservative strategy is denoted as 
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Fig.l A"； and A", 
In Fig. 1，A'l is the shaded area bounded by the horizontal line AB, OC and p axis. AB denotes 
the equilibrium incentive compatibility constraint of G to honestly deliver message m = 1 instead of 
keeping silent (m = 0.5) when s ignal= 1 is observed. Here it should be emphasized all constraints in 
the following analysis are equilibrium specific constraints for the reason that D，s policies, which are 
used to calculate the marginal benefit to M, are pertinent to M's strategy. I f 厂丨 is above AB, then 
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when signal = 1 is received, G wil l prefer keep silent (m = 0.5) to w = 1. For Q the marginal benefit of 
deliveringm = 0instead of.m = 0.5when signal^ = Ois received is higher than the marginal benefit of 
deliveringm = 1 instead of.m = 0.5when signals = \is received; and when no signal is observed, it is 
best for G not to deliver any message no matter what is. Hence i f p^ is below AB, G is willing to 
honestly deliver message whatever signal is received. OC depicts the equilibrium incentive 
compatibility constraint of B to deliver message m = 1 instead of keeping silent O = 0.5 )• Because the 
expected payoff of B is independent of the signal received, i f is below OC, the marginal benefit 
for B to deliver m = 1 instead of w = 0.5 is higher than p, no matter what signal is observed, in other 
words, OC denotes the maximum cost which is bearable for B to always deliver w = 1. Therefore, 
i f (A、y )^e A;，G wil l always honestly report signal received and B wil l take radical strategy. 
Aj is bounded by the horizontal line DE, OF and/?! axis. DE denotes the equilibrium incentive 
compatibility constraints of G to honestly deliver message m = 1 instead of keeping silent (m = 0.5) 
when signal^ = l is observed. I f p,is above DE, then when signal5 = 1 is received, G wil l preferm = 0.5 
to m = 1. For the same two reasons of the previous equilibrium, i f p^ is below DE, G is willing to 
honestly deliver message whatever signal is received. OF depicts the equilibrium incentive 
compatibility constraint of B to keep silent (w = 0.5) instead of delivering w = 1. Also the same as the 
previous equilibrium, i f p, is above OF, it is too costly for B to deliver w = 1 no matter what signal is 
observed, in other words, OF depicts the minimum cost which prevents B from delivering message 
m = 1 .Therefore, i f {p;,j3)eA]，G wil l honestly report the signal received while B wil l take 
conservative strategy. 
In Fig. 1，DE is above AB and OF is steeper than OC. Because in equilibrium with B using 
conservative strategy, when D receives messagem = lhe is sure that G observes signal^ = 1, hence the 
policy is higher than that in equilibrium with B using radical strategy, in which D is not sure 
whether the message m = 1 is delivered by B or G and what kind of signal is observed when w = 1 is 
delivered by B. Hence, with the same a^ ^ in both equilibria, the marginal benefit (a^ - a^^) of both B 
and G to deliver m = 1 is higher in equilibrium with B using conservative strategy. 
Between these two equilibria, social welfare is higher i f B uses conservative strategy instead of 
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radical strategy. I f B uses conservative strategy, no signal is contaminated but message w = 1 is 
contaminated i f B uses radical strategy because D fails to figure out whether M is B or G and what 
signal is observed by B when w = 1 is delivered. Therefore, here comes the following proposition. 
Proposition 1 Social welfare is higher in the equilibrium with B using conservative strategy and G 
honestly reporting signal observed than that in equilibrium B using radical strategy and G honestly 
reporting signal observed. 
Denote the best cost level under the cost for speech scheme givenp as p\(j3). According to 
Proposition 1，to maximize the social welfare, /?；(/?) should satisfy the proposition below: 
Proposition 2 Under the cost for speech scheme, when p<~p^,p\{0) increases as p increases： 
y^hen P> P^, p\ ( f i ) equals to zero. 
The intuition of Proposition 2 is as follows, p, is only effective when the difference of benefit 
between B and G is small, i.e. wheny^< p^，in which case the larger the difference between B and G 
is, the higher the cost should be set. However, i f the difference is large enough, p, becomes 
ineffective and B wi l l always deliver m = 1. Taken the welfare of M into consideration, for any p， 
e《weakly dominatesp,(y^)e ，therefore/?；{fi)=^{p)，which is shown as the dotted line in 
Fig.l. 
ii. The Cost for Message Scheme 
When the content of the message is verifiable, even the state of nature is unverifiable, D has two 
options: either to implement the cost for speech scheme or the cost for message scheme, which 
imposes penalty only when message is delivered. 
With other things being equal, the only difference between the cost for speech scheme and the 
cost for message scheme is messagem = Ois costly under the former but costless under the later. By 
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Lemma 2，B never uses messagem = 0; accordingly the cost for speech scheme and the cost for 
message scheme actually have the same effect on B. Therefore, when the cost is tolerable for G to 
always honestly report his signal observed, the equilibria under the cost for speech scheme are the 
same as those under the cost for message scheme. Denote A^^ and A； as the sets of (p,，/?) which sustain 
the equilibrium with B using conservative strategy and the equilibrium with B using radical strategy 
under the cost for message scheme、k = i ) . The relationship between p^ and p of the two equilibria 
under the cost for message is shown in Fig. 2. 
p、:、 
D — — 乙 ！ -
z C .• ^ ^ -
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Fig.2 A2andA^2 
Similar with Fig. 1，in Fig.2, A； is the shaded area bounded byAB, OC and p axis. AB denotes 
the equilibrium incentive compatibility constraint of G to honestly deliver message m = 1 instead of 
keeping silent O = 0.5) when signal s = \is observed. For the same reason of the case under the cost 
for speech, for G，the marginal benefit of delivering m = 0 instead of w = 0.5 when s = 0 is received is 
higher than the marginal benefit of delivering m = 1 instead o fw = 0.5 when signal s = \is received; and 
when no signal is observed, it is best for G not to deliver any message no matter what p, is. Hence i f 
Pi is below AB, G is willing to honestly deliver message whatever signal is received. OC depicts the 
equilibrium incentive compatibility constraint of B to deliverw = linstead of keeping silent (m = 0.5). 
is the shaded area bounded by DE，OF mdp, axis. DE denotes the equilibrium incentive 
compatibility constraints of G to honestly deliver message m = 1 instead of keeping silent (m = 0.5) 
when signal ^ -- l is observed. For the same reason of the case under the cost for speech scheme, i f 
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广1 IS below DE, G is willing to honestly deliver message whatever signal is received. OF depicts the 
equilibrium incentive compatibility constraint of B to keep silent (m = 0.5) instead of delivering m = 1. 
Because the strategy of M in equilibrium under the cost for speech scheme and that under the 
cost for message scheme is the same, the policy in equilibrium is also the same. Hence equilibrium 
incentive constraints under these two schemes are identical, that is, the sets of (/?,/^)in Fig.l and 
Fig.2 are identical. 
Proposition 3 The cost for speech scheme and the cost for message scheme have the same effect on 
both B and G 
Proposition 3 in turn implies the comparison of social welfare and the analysis of D's cost 
setting under the cost for message scheme are the same as that under the cost for speech scheme. 
Besides，Proposition 3 also implies whether the content of the message is verifiable does not make 
any difference to social welfare provided that the state of nature remains unverifiable. However, the 
cost for message scheme is weakly dominant over the cost for speech scheme in the sense that the 
welfare of messenger is higher under the former since it is costless for messenger to deliver w = 0. 
iii. The Cost for Bias Scheme 
When both the state of nature and the content of message become verifiable, D has one more 
choice in addition to the previous two schemes: to implement the cost for bias scheme, that is, to 
impose cost when the message received is different from the state of nature. 
By Lemma 2, B never delivers message m = 0. Under this scheme, the expected payoff of B can 
be summarized as follows. 
•5 = 0 ^ = 1 5 = 0.5 
w = l a i - p y a^ - > 9 ( 1 - 7 ) 议1 - i P 
W = 0.5 «o.5 «0.5 ^0.5 
Table 4 Expected payoff of B under the cost for bias scheme 
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1 note from Table 4 that the expected cost is highest for B to deliver message m = 1 when signal 
s = 0 is received, py>\p> pi^-y). Hence i f B is willing to take risk of delivering m = 1 when s 二 0 
IS observed, i.e. a^, <a, -py, B wil l not keep silent either when signals = lis observed or no signal is 
observed. 
Likewise, the expected cost is lowest for B to deliver messagem = 1 when signals = lis received. 
Hence i f B prefers to keep silent whens = lis observed, i.e. a, - p { l - / ) < a ,^，B wil l not take risk to 
deliver m 二 1 when 5 = 0 is observed or no signal is observed. 
These observations bring us to Lemma 4，which states that, i f B delivers m = 1 when 5 = 1 is 
observed, he wil l not keep silent when 5 = 1 is observed or no signal is observed, and i f B keeps silent 
when5 = 1 is observed, he wil l not deliverm = 1 when5 = 0is observed or no signal is observed. 
Lemma 4 Under the cost for bias scheme, if m^ =\, then m【5 * 0.5 ’ mf 本 0.5 ； if w 广=0.5, then 
Following Lemma 2 and Lemma 4, we can conclude that there are four possible equilibria under 
the cost for bias scheme. Two possible equilibria under the cost for bias scheme are the same as the 
two equilibria analyzed earlier: the equilibrium with B using radical strategy and the equilibrium 
with B using conservative strategy. The strategies of M in the other two equilibria are summarized in 
Table 5 and Table 6: 
B G 
= 0 5 = 1 y = s = 0 5 = 1 s = 0.5 
m=0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
m = l 0 1 1 0 1 0 
m = 0.5 1 0 0 0 0 1 
Table 5 Strategy of M with B using semi-radical strategy 
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B G 
•y = 0 s = l 5 = 0.5 = 0 •y-l s = 0.5 
爪 = 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
w = l 0 1 0 0 1 0 
w = 0.5 1 0 1 0 0 1 
Table 6 Strategy of M with B using semi-conservative strategy 
Denote the equilibrium with B using radical strategy, semi-radical strategy, semi-conservative 
strategy and conservative strategy under the cost for speech scheme as B^^E^, E^ ^ and E。. 
Proposition 4 Among the four possible equilibria under the cost for bias scheme, the social 
welfare of E^ is highest; the social welfare of E^ is lowest; the comparison of the social welfare of 
E^ and Ec is ambiguous. 
The intuition behind Proposition 4 is as follows. D may elicit some useful information from B in 
. In contrast, no information can be elicited from B inE^ otE。. Hence social welfare is lower in 五广 
or Ec than that in E^ ^ because of the information loss. Compared with E^，in which both w = 1 and 
m = 0.5 are contaminated, inE^ only message m = 0.5 is contaminated. Hence social welfare is higher 
in 五,c than that inE^ because of comparatively less severe information distortion. Therefore, among 
the four equilibria, the social welfare of E^ is highest. 
Other than^-^，among the remaining three equilibira, the social welfare is lowest inE^，which 
can be explained as follows: by Proposition 1，the social welfare of E^  is higher than that of £；; D is 
able to elicit information from silence when B uses semi-radical strategy hence the reduction of 
social welfare in 五"caused by information loss is less compared with that inE^. 
The social welfare reduction in 五疋 is caused by information contamination, while the social 
welfare reduction is caused by information loss. The reduction in social welfare of these two 
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equilibria is difficult to compare hence it is difficult to tell in which equilibrium D's payoff is higher. 
In each equilibrium, to encourage G honestly report the signal observed, the cost of delivering 
message p、should satisfy the following conditions: 
〜 , 。 卞 ， - 卞 、 z m i n f “ . 5 - 0 2 丨 〜 ) 彻 L 』 
。 广 一 ！ 】 一 ， ， — 1 ⑶ 
By Lemma 2，B never delivers message w = 0. B favors high action. I f the cost is so small that B 
is willing to deliver message m = 1 even signal s = 0 is observed, then by Lemma 4, B chooses to 
always deliver messagem = l. ThusE”emerges as long asp、satisfies the condition: 
五 “ ， 饥 ” 风 “ 5 ， 爪 A 以。5) (4) 
r 
I f the cost is higher, B wil l be less radical and prefer to keep silent when signals = 0 is observed, 
thus E^ exists with the following condition: 
the LHS of condition (5) represents the minimum cost needed to let B keep silent (w = 0.5) instead of 
delivering m = 1 when 5 = 0is observed while the RHS of condition represents the maximum cost 
sustainable for B to deliver w = 1 to induce policy when no signal is observed. Because the chance of 
paying cost when signal^ = lis observed is smaller than that when no signal is observed, hence, i f 
condition (5) is satisfied, B is to use deliver w = 1 when s e {o.5，l}is received. 
I f the cost is even higher, B wil l become even more conservative and deliver w = 1 only when 
s = 0 is observed otherwise keep silent. Thus £•扣 exists i f the conditions below are satisfied: 
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〜 今 ” 〈 五 ‘ 成 ， Z ) 外 丨 一 〜 i - a j ⑷ 
the LHS of condition (6) represents the minimum cost needed to let B keep silent O = 0.5) instead of 
delivering m = 1 when no signal is observed while the RHS of condition represents the maximum cost 
bearable for B to deliverm = 1 to induce policy whens = \is observed. 
I f the cost is so high that B is not willing to deliver message m = 1 even signal 5 = l is observed, 
then by Lemma 4，B wil l always keep silent. Thus E。emerges when p^ satisfies the condition: 
五 W …，历〈五H八 “ . 5，讲〜A > A ( ” 5 ) (7) 
Denote A'3，i g [r, sr, sc, c] as the set of {p^，；^)which sustains E, and denote the maximum of p and 
the minimum of p in E, under the cost for bias as 瓦 and & . Leaving A3 to discuss later, in Fig. 3-1,1 
first illustrate A'3，A" and A3 which wi l l never overlap independent of y . 
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Fig. 3-1 Aj,? 
In Fig. 3-1 (as well as the following Fig. 3-2，3-3 and 3-4)，the horizontal lines AB, DE and HI 
denote the constraint (3) in different equilibria, below which G is willing to honestly deliver message 
whatever signal is received. Same as what is emphasized in the analysis of the previous schemes, all 
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constraints are equilibrium specific, and hence the maximum costs bearable for G are different and 
result in different heights of AB，DE and HI. 
In A；，OC depicts the condition (4). I f p、is below OC, by Lemma 4, B wil l always deliver m = 1. 
Therefore i f (厂3，永 ，G wil l honestly report signal received and B wi l l take radical strategy. A^ is 
bounded by DE, OF and OG. OF and OG separately depict the LHS and RHS of condition (5). Given 
any (广3，A) e Af，G wil l honestly report signal received and B wi l l take semi-radical strategy. OJ in A3 
depicts the condition (7), above which, by Lemma 4，B wil l always keep silent. Consequently, i f 
，G wil l honestly report signal received while B wi l l take conservative strategy. 
I now turn to the relationship of p、and；^ in A? . In 五…the maximum cost that induces B to 
deliverm = 1 whens = l i s ^ = 二广；and inE。，the minimum cost to prevent B from delivering 
m = \\s^ =巧一 ;。5) . As the marginal benefit for B to deliver m = 1 instead of keeping silent in E 沈 
is higher than that i n t h e r e f o r e there is overlapping betweenA'3and. In^^D fails to 
elicit any information about the state of nature when no message is delivered hence makes neutral 
policy (a。5 = \ ) while in E^ ^ D can expect that M either observes s = 0 or no signal is observed 
hence a。5 < j . Since the policies made whenm = 1 is received in both 五此 and E。are the same, the 
marginal benefit of delivering w = 1 instead of keeping silent is higher in£此. 
Given different / , A^ wi l l either completely covered by A'； or partly overlap with A；. The sets A'3 
i e different ；^ are illustrated in Fig. 3-2，3-3 and 3-4. 
When!〈；/</丨3，从^  ^ A ' ^ - A »the relationship of p^ mdJ3 is shown in Fig. 3-2: 
3 V _ 3 q 
/ 1 ~ 4 4(l-A+Aq) 
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When r , < r < y j the relationship of p、and p is shown in Fig. 3 -3: 
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Fig. 3-3 A'3，i € {r，sr.sc, c} 
When r2 < r < l , A c relationship of p、and p is shown in Fig. 3-4. 
4 _ 1 Y 
,2 _ 丄[\~X+Xq}{i-X+q+^xj) 
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In Fig. 3-2 (as well as in Fig. 3-3 and 3-4), A； is bounded by KL, OM and ON. KL depicts the 
constraint (3) inE沉，while OM and ON separately depict the LHS and RHS of condition (6). 
As r increases, HI increases OJ rotates to the left. The change can be explained as follows. For 
the same difference between B and G (/? )，as the accuracy of information ( r ) increases, B and G are 
more confident of the signal observed being congruent with the true state of nature, hence the 
minimum cost of to prevent B from delivering m = 1 when 5 = l is observed and the maximum cost 
which is bearable for G to honestly deliver message also increase. 
It should be pointed out that, i f is impossible to guarantee the realization of E 沈 even 
A i P ) e .As shown in Fig. 3-2, when；^〈；^，A? c A； ’ g i v e n p , e i t h e r ^ ^ orE。may exist. 
In this case, given the same cost, i f D anticipates B wil l deliver m = 1 when j = 1 is received, B does 
deliverm = 1 whenj = lis received in equilibrium; and i f D anticipates B wil l keep silent when^ = lis 
received, B does keep silent when s = lis received in equilibrium. Therefore, if^<r<ri,given 
厂3 (/?) e A3, B wil l either take semi-conservative strategy or conservative strategy. 
Denote the best cost level given p under the cost for bias scheme as p] (fi). For any p，p[ [fi) e A3 
weakly dominates C )^ e A^ 〗，therefore p i ( /? )=^ {p ) . It is easy to show that p^ is best set as dotted 
line in Fig. 3-2，Fig.3-3 and Fig. 3-4，and this can be explained as follows. When difference between 
B and G is small, i.e. the larger the difference is, the higher the cost should be set to prevent 
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B from delivering biased message. And when difference between B and G is large, i.e. , the 
cost to prevent B from delivering is too high, in order not to discourage G from truth telling, it is best 
for D to give up imposing cost. However, i f best choice to set cost may be 
pM = 《 o r 广3 (p) = pI since it is difficult to compare the social welfare of E and£" . These 
observations bring about the Proposition 5 below. 
Proposition 5 Under the cost of bias scheme, if P<Tl,p\ ( f i ) increases as p increases; if 
= p\ { f i ) is undetermined. 
One thing is worth mentioning is that, unlike the previous two schemes, D can elicit useful 
information from silence under the cost for bias scheme. Lemma 3 implies B has no incentive to 
make differentiation under the cost for speech scheme or the cost for message scheme. However, as 
long as the cost is not so high as to make B use conservative strategy, B has incentive to differentiate 
under the cost for bias scheme for that the cost is dependent on the signal received. Because ofB's 
differentiation, D can elicit useful information from silence under the cost for bias scheme, while 
silence is totally uninformative for D at all under previous two schemes. For example, inE此 oxE^ 
under the cost for bias scheme, D may deduce that B may observe signal 5 = 0 when B is not willing 
to deliver any message. This observation brings us to the following proposition. 
Proposition 6 Silence is informative only if the cost is dependent on the state of nature; silence is 
informative if pi (；^) e U 
iv. Scheme Comparison 
Given the equilibria under different schemes, D chooses the scheme and cost level which gives 
highest social welfare for any given . Before discussing the scheme comparison, it should be 
pointed out that, by condition (3) and (7)，p^  is independent of y，hence is the same under three cost 
schemes. This implies that, for any /? , it is possible for D to induce B to use the same strategy under 
the cost for bias scheme as he would under the other two schemes. 
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Define//(y?) as the optimal cost level given；^ .//(y^)and the scheme selection should satisfy the 
proposition below. 
Proposition 7 Suppose that the decision maker is able to implement any of the three schemes, then 
the following hold: 
1, P. {fi、=幽、,y^hen p 么 I ; 
2. p*{p、：Q^ ,when p > l ; 
3.1 If the social welfare of E。is lower than that of E^, 
3.2 If the social welfare of E。is higher than that of E^ ’ 
P …\eL{A-enJc<p 沉 “ 〈 口 1， 
Proposition 7 can be interpreted and explained as follows. Clause 1 of Proposition 7 states that, 
i f the disparity between B and G is small enough, i.e. / ? < ^ , D c a n attain highest social welfare 
under the cost for bias scheme by setting//(；^)=《(^)，which induces B to use semi-conservative 
strategy while allowing G to honestly report signal. Clause 2 says that, i f the disparity between B and 
G is large enough, i.e. > , D is best not to impose any cost. Because i f the difference between B 
and G is too large, the cost to prevent B from delivering biased message is higher than the maximum 
cost to sustain G to honestly report signal. Not to discourage G from honestly delivering message 
and guarantee G's freedom to express, D will choose not to impose any cost. 
l i <l3</3^ , the best scheme and cost level depend on the welfare comparison of E。or E^ . 
Clause 3.1 states that, i f the social welfare of E。is lower than that of 五^，D is best to implement the 
cost for bias scheme and set cost supporting E^ . In this case, for any p，D will implement the cost 
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for bias scheme and the best cost level /?'(/?)is shown in Fig. 3-5^ 
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Fig. 3-5 Best Cost Level / / ( / ? ) 
Clause 3.2 states that, i f the social welfare of E。is higher than that of E^，the setting of the best 
cost level further depends on y . 
I f + < / < ,2，the maximum of E^ is smaller that that of E。, i.e. fsc^Tc- When it possible to 
realize EXP^ < p < p ^ \ t o attain higher social welfare, D is best to implement the cost for message 
scheme and set p* (p) = p^). Comparing between the cost for message scheme and the cost for 
speech scheme, the former weakly dominates the latter in the sense that the welfare of messenger is 
higher under the former since it is costless for messenger to deliver m = 0. Comparing between the 
cost for message scheme and the cost for bias scheme, it is better for D to make use of the cost for 
message scheme instead of the cost for bias scheme to realized, for the minimum cost under the 
former is smaller than that under the latter. And when it impossible to realize it is 
best for D to implement the cost for bias scheme and set//(y0) = p f (/?). The trend of the best cost 
level//(/?)with depicted in Fig. 3-6. 
5 Fig. 3-5 only shows the general trend of the best cost level, in fact, the precise cost level changes as , changes but the 
trend remains unchanged. 
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If>2 < / < 1，the maximum/? of E^ is larger than that of E^，i.e. When 疋 it is 
best for D to implement the cost for bias scheme and set//(/?)=《(^)，in which case the trend of the 
cost level is same as what is shown in Fig. 3-5. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
By establishing a static one period game of an uninformed policy maker, who is benevolent and 
values common folks' freedom of speech, and a potentially informed messenger, this essay 
investigates the strategies of ideologues in equilibrium, compares the social welfare of equilibrium 
under different cost schemes and discusses the best cost scheme and cost levels for policy maker to 
set to attain highest social welfare. 
The finding of this essay has following indications. First, when the issue is rather controversial, 
that is, wheny? is large, no cost should be imposed i f the policy maker is keen on protecting the 
majority's freedom of speech since the cost to prevent ideologues from delivering biased message is 
too high and discourages common folks from honestly delivering message. Second, when the true 
state is unverifiable, limiting the act of delivering speech and limiting the content of the message 
make no difference to the social welfare. Third, in general, ex post scheme, the cost for bias scheme, 
is better than the ex ante schemes, the cost for speech and cost for message schemes, in maximizing 
social welfare. Under the cost for bias scheme, silence may convey useful information. Four, the cost 
imposed dose not monotonically increase as the disparity of common folks and ideologues increases, 
in order not to discourage common folks from honest message delivery. 
This essay is a preliminary attempt in understanding the issue of freedom of speech using an 
economic model. Further researches can be made in many aspects. First, the analysis in this essay is 
restricted to pure strategy used by messenger, to solve the model comprehensively, mixed strategy 
can be taken into consideration. Second, this is a game between two players, more players can be 
included in future research, for example, a game with one decision maker and two or more 
messengers with different types. In the model with multiple players, the interaction between 
messengers may also be taken into account, making the model closer to the situation in reality. Third, 
the payoff of ideologue can be counted as part of the social welfare. In my model, the set of 
ideologue is treated as zero-measure set hence the social welfare is only related to the payoff of 
common folks. However, to make the calculation of social welfare complete, the payoff of ideologue 
may also be taken into consideration in future study. 
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Proof of Lemma 1: 
Lemma 1 can be expressed in detail as follows. 
ne strategy ofD a{m)is weakly increasing in those messages m that are delivered in equilibrium. In 
other words, D 's action should satisfy the following conditions: 
^ 以 0.5，if both messages m = 0 and m = 0.5 are to be delivered; 
以0 5 ^ ，if both messages m = 0.5 and m = \are to be delivered; 
cIq ^ a^s，if both messages w = 0 and m = 0.5 are to be delivered. 
By Assumption 1，(爪oko)—历oh)^ Oand/?丑(mo|〜)-p,{m,\s,)> 0，hence a, < a,,. 
〜广 讲。h).少1) 亡 严ksh ) .少丨） 
TX^-pg(饥0k)+(1 -斗及(讲0k)]• h ) - I 历 0 1=0,1,0.5 
^ (爪。ko)-pg(饥。h)]+(1 -斗 \ P B (历。 K ) — P B (爪。 K ) ] } . [ ^ ( 〜 h ) - K ) ] ^ o 
^ (讲 0 ko ) - P G (讲 0 h \PB (讲。K ) 一 PB (历0 ki 
<=PG (奶。k ) - PG “ K (m。I J � ) - PB (m�\s,)>0 
By Assumption 1, Po {m, ) - p^ (m, J > 0 and p, [m, ) - p^ (m, ) ^  0, hence ^ o^  <a,. 
〜 , r r 广 广 “ . 5 h ) 了⑷ 二 / ^ k h ) . 少 1) 
0 5 1 M爪0.5 h ). P(份 1 )+ A爪 0.5 h )• ) 一 h )• K ) - ) 
。 H V ' - P g (爪 1 k (讲 1 k ) ] . h ) - p { s i h (=0,1,0.5 
0 {义.[pg(爪 1 ki)—Pg(历 1 ko)]+(1 - 斗 \pb(rh)-Pb(w,K)]}• [ p ( … h ) - h ) ] < o 
<=> ^-[PG (爪 1 k , ) - P G {M, K )]+ (1 — 斗 \PB (讲 1K ) - P B (讲 1K 
PG “ H )-PG (讲 I ^O ) “，Z^ B ('"I K )-PB (肌！ 
By Assumption 1 , P g ( ' " o k o ) - P g ( ' ^ o k i ( ' ^ o k o ) - P b K k i ) > 0 Pa[m,\sy 
Pb “ k i ) - P B “ k 0 ， h e n c e a^ < a, 
‘ 1 h). )+ M讲。k). piPo) 一 piphh). p{ci),)+ p{m,l^y。). p{a),) 
<=> 本 1).本。h)^ A饥0K)-/? pirhh) 
^ PG (历。k�)-PG (爪。K {m, |>y�)-p^ (m�\s,)>0 
PG (爪 1K )-PG (历 i K K ) - PB (^i 
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Social Welfare Comparison 
The social welfare of g {r,5r,5c,c}can be represented by the expected payoff of the policy 
maker which is denoted as t/； and a) denotes the policy in E, when message m = y, j e {o,0.5,1} is received. 
1. Welfare comparison between E” and E。 
t/;=—k—O)2.i�(l-0-(«O�l)2.iA(l-,Xl —[金义(l- ,Xl-力+i(l —义)] 
- (< -1)2 . b � ( l - - 0 广 + 匆 - ( < . 广 1 ) 2 . +匆 
二-(< -0)2 . + � ( l - d - ( < -1)2 ]义(1 —,Xl — - o h 义 k -1 广 + � ( l i ) 
- ( < .广 0 ) 2 . [ +知 + +(1 一 义 ) ] — 1 ) 2 •[女知 + 女(1-义)] 
•.. < =<.<5 =<5 
••• [义(1 - q U — < k + < - 2r)+ 2(1 - - < k + < -1): 
= i [a(1 — q)(a； — ,)2 + 2(1 — - i)2 ] > 0 
2. Welfare comparison between E” (x= 1) and E^ (x=0) 
Assume B uses mixed strategy and assigns probability x to choose deliver message m = l and the 
probability to keep silent is 1-x. The strategy of M is shown in Table 6. 
B G 
•s = 0 >5 = 1 ^ = 0.5 s = 0 s = l •y^ O.S 
m=0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
m = l X 1 1 0 1 0 
m = 0.5 1-x 0 0 0 0 1 
Table 6 Strategy of M 
Since D hopes to maximize social welfare, the goal of D can be expressed as: 
m s 6) m s 0} 
Denote the best D's best response when message is m = /received as a]. By the envelope theorem, 
警二警 | � : 4 M X W ) k - 2 " ; -“ : 5 ) < 0 
33 
The utility of D is decreasing when x increases, which means it is better for D i f B keeps silent 
when signal s 二 0 is received given G always honestly delivers the signal. 
3. Welfare comparison between E^ (x= 1) and E^ (x=0) 
Assume B uses mixed strategy and assigns probability x to choose deliver message m = 1 and the 
probability to keep silent is 1-x. The strategy of M is shown in Table 7. 
^ = 0 s = l s = 0.5 s = 0 s = 0.5 
w=0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
m = l 0 1 x 0 1 0 
m = 0.5 1 0 1-x 0 0 1 
Table 7 Strategy of M 
By the envelope theorem, 
警 = 警 I 心 广 ( 1 - 斗 “ . k -心 ) . (1 - “1•- <5) 
• A < 0 ^ <0 
• dx dx 
dx [{\-X)\\-q)+2{\-X)'{\-x\q-¥2Xq\ 
. q[l-q)'{2r-\)\\-Xf 
dx [(l -X)'{\-q)+ 2xq{l-A) + - q)] 
息 <0 
The utility of D is decreasing when x increases, which means it is better for D i f B keeps silent 
when no signal is received given G always honestly delivers the signal. 
4. Welfare comparison between E^ (x= 1) and E^  (x=0) 
Assume B uses mixed strategy and assigns probability x to choose deliver message m = \ and the 
probability to keep silent is 1-x. The strategy of M is shown in Table 8. 
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5 = 0 ^ = 1 ^ = 0.5 5 = 0 s = l 5 = 0.5 
m=0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
w = l 0 X 0 0 1 0 
m = 0.5 1 1-x 1 0 0 1 
Table 8 Strategy of M 
By the envelope theorem, 
The utility of D is increasing when x increases, which means it is better for D i f B delivers 
message m = 1 when signals = l is received given G always honestly delivers the signal. 
Proof for the relationship of p and p under the cost for bias scheme 
Denote [r,sr,sc,c]as the set of {p^，0)which sustainsE.and denote the maximum of p and 
the minimum of p in E. under the cost for bias as and p,. 
Firstly，consider the relationship of p in different equilibria. From the previous welfare 
comparison between (x=l) mdE^ (x=0) with the mixed strategy shown in Table 7. It is easy to 
show, 
F - m i n f 4 z - “ i * — “ : 5 ) rjao-alJ 
“ ( 1 - / ) . ( « ; - ‘ ) / x=i 
since 




^ ‘ ‘ 1 ~\l-q)-2{\-X)q - ~ ( 1 -斗 ( 1 -扣却 
。，（1-,).(1-斗(1-分 
( 1 - 斗 ( l l ) + 2 却 
we have 
Hence, 
k -fosJ ^ r k -alsJ 
2 ( 1 - , ) . ( 《 ; - < 5 ) , = 。 ( i - , ) . ( “ ; - c 4 L 
If 厂 - 。 : - ‘ ） 
since 
it is easy to show 
Therefore, 
Because 八=；^ 一+，we have 
射 ( 1 - ， ) . ? 二 + 一 
[ > 瓦 〜 1 — 一 ) .“ + — <,<1 
Since /？^  = +00, it is obvious that 
Now considering the relationship of p in different equilibria. Also from the previous welfare 
comparison between £•恋（x二 1) and 五优（x=0) with the mixed strategy shown in Table 7. It is easy to 
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show, 
二 m i n f 外 ; � 5 ) {a:-a:M2r-a:-a:.s) {a：-a： J 1 ^ —(。；-心) 
广 丄 ， 1 — V ， 1 一 ， 一 1 
V 2 —厂 =^1 卜 y 一 2 ；,=0 
Since 
k-«0、]U<«i.|x=。-«:.5“ 
一 q[l-qH2r-\)i\-Xf ‘ 。 
we have 
1 1 I ， 
2 x=\ 2 2 
hence 
Psr 
From the previous welfare comparison between五,(x=l) and£； (x=0) with the mixed strategy 
shown in Table 6. It is easy to show, 
r y ， l - y ， — y 
V ‘ x=\ , jc=i y / *=o 
I f f 二如-“;-“:5) J 
Since 
Ks — 2Aq\\-X)\2r-\)\\-q) 二 q 
dx [{\-X)\\-q\(\-x)+2Aqf ， 
_ (1-斗 (1-2 , ) . (1 -々 ) . ( l l ) ‘。 
we have 
k - ^ o - s ) <(“:-“。• 5) 
厂 x=\ y x=o 
\-y , ， 1 \-Y 
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Because 
1 、丄’ ’ 
\ — y Y V 
‘ x=l ‘ x=\ 广 X=0 
it is easy to show 
(“:-‘).(2/-“:-“；：、) - “:.5 
l-y , y • 
‘ x-\ ‘ ；c=0 
Therefore, 
Pr 
Sincep = = { < - < . ) ' ] if 广 z k - < 5 ) 2 - 彻 - 1 ) 
1 - , 此 \ 1 - r ， i-r J "一 <一 < 5 - ( 1 - 义 + _ ] + — ) ， 
— - < s ) T ‘ . 
Psc = —H — . It IS easy to prove 




Consider the relationship of p^ and ^  which is conditional on 厂.As it is known that 
hence, 
� ^ 3 q 
F u r t h e r m o r e , - < s ) \ 2 r - a r { < - < . ) ' ] 
1 i i - r ， i - r J， 
叫 " ^ ^ ， 2 ( l l ; ) V 么 r ^ It IS easy to prove 
1 1 I 2(1-AK 1 , 2匆 2， 
38 
. (a"' - a"" ) y —丄 
Since y>\, ^——< .Therefore, 
i 1 - 厂 
Psr < 4 . 
To summarize, 
一 一 2 4 + 
, i f l - ^ x < / < l - 7 vf 
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